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Judicial deference and the efficiency of the common law

I.

Introduction
Economists and legal scholars in the law-and-economics tradition have long been

occupied with the question of whether, and the extent to which, the common law is efficient.
There have been two main approaches taken in the scholarly literature. One approach has been
to focus on judges, who are modeled having various motivations including, but not necessarily
confined to, concern for efficient allocation of resources.1 However, to the extent they are
concerned with efficiency, this attitude will be reflected in their opinions.2 This argument has
been subject to criticism by scholars on various grounds, including questioning the assumption
that judges are principally interested in promoting efficient resource use, at the expense of other
arguments in their utility function such as ideology, fairness, and professional reputation and
status.3
The other main approach has been to model the common law in an evolutionary way, by
focusing on the impacts of selective litigation behavior on the content of the law. The basic
argument here has two components. One is that inefficient rulings tend to be litigated more
frequently and thus, are more likely to be overturned.4 The other is that beneficiaries of efficient
rulings have more incentive to invest in litigation than beneficiaries of inefficient rulings.5 Thus,
over time there are tendencies in the common law toward efficiency.6 A number of scholars
have, however, questioned how strongly this theoretical prediction is borne out empirically,
especially when you take into consideration other features of the legal process, such as precedent
and asymmetric information. Some have concluded that the effect, if there is any, is weak.7
Generally speaking, there are good reasons to question both of these approaches, in terms of
explanatory and predictive power.

A serious shortcoming of both of these approaches is that they tend to ignore other
institutional influences on judges that may have important efficiency implications. Key among
these is statutory law. In the U.S. legal system, statutory law and common law are highly
interdependent, with the legislatures and courts comprising both complementary and substitute
sources of legal rules. This fact has been, of course, recognized by legal scholars, who have
explored this interaction in a variety of areas of the law, including economic regulation, administrative law, and strategic rent-seeking by organized interest groups. Economists have not
explored the implications of the relationship between legislatures and courts regarding the
efficiency of the common law, despite good reasons to believe that this relationship may be
important.
In this paper, I explore the implications of a factor heretofore largely unconsidered in the
literature on the efficiency of common law: judicial review of legislative enactments. The basic
idea here is a simple one: under modern theories of public choice, there is commonly little reason
to believe that legislative actions will result in efficient resource allocation. However, in many
areas of the law, there exists a powerful norm that judges should be largely deferential to legislative enactments. If judges tend to defer to legislatures, they will then tend to uphold inefficient
statutes. To the extent that this happens, the common law will itself reflect those inefficiencies.
I will return to this point below in Section III.
To be clear, a large number of studies examine judicial review of statutes.8 Those that
follow the public choice approach commonly argue that judicial review may be justified as a
means of correcting undesirable political outcomes. However, these studies have generally
focused on the implications for improving political outcomes, with the courts behaving as a
corrective force. They have generally not focused on the implications for the efficiency of the

common law itself.9 But judicial review is a two-way street: the more the courts defer to
statutes, the more similar are the outcomes of common law and statutory law in terms of
efficiency. Conversely, the less courts defer to statutes (that is, the more they engage in judicial
activism), the more they will differ. Whether the common law will be more or less efficient than
statutory law is a separate question, which will be addressed further below.
The remainder of this paper develops these ideas at greater length. In the next section, I
briefly review the scholarly literature on the efficiency of the common law. Then, in section III,
I develop a model of legislative-judicial interaction, in which courts can engage in either judicial
deference or judicial review regarding legislatures who are either naïve or sophisticated in their
expectations regarding judicial review. The key result here is that judicial deference has important implications for the efficiency of the common law. In section IV, I examine the implications
of the model for how to interpret the long-term history of judicial review of legislation in the
United States. Section V discusses judicial review within the context of a particular policy
example that has been of much interest to economists: occupational licensing. Section VI
examines judicial review of occupational licensing in U.S. history, with a special focus on the
Progressive Era. This was a crucial formative period during which there was a dramatic
expansion of occupational licensing statutes, both across different states and applied to a wide
range of occupations. Section VII reports the results of an econometric analysis that assesses the
efficiency of the common law regarding occupational licensing during the Progressive Era.
Section VIII concludes.
II.

What do we know about the efficiency of the common law?
The notion that the common law exhibits a distinct and persistent economic logic has

been foundational to the field of law and economics. A stronger version of this notion is the

influential one that the common law tends to economic efficiency, a view that has been
vigorously championed by Richard Posner.10 The idea that the common law is efficient, or at
least has strong tendencies in this direction, has prompted many economists to ask the existential
question: Why should we expect the common law to be efficient?
This has not been an easy question for economists to answer. Posner’s original answer –
that judges prefer efficient outcomes – seems unsatisfying to economists accustomed to models
of rational, self-interested economic behavior.11 It is unclear what benefits Posnerian judges are
obtaining for themselves when they hand down rulings, especially because the legal system
provides no mechanism to tie rulings to personal rewards. Indeed, the judicial system has a
number of features that are designed to insulate judges from economic incentives to rule in
certain ways, like lifetime tenure (in some cases) and conflict of interest rules. These facts seem
to leave room for judges to indulge their own preferences for certain other goals that may have
little to do with efficiency, like fairness, political ideology, and interest in servicing various other
social goals. Subsequent economic attempts to model judges have done so by expanding the
arguments in their objective function, adding things like: interest in reputation, prestige, influence within the legal profession, professional advancement, and the costs of producing rulings.12
However, it remains unclear why efficient common law should result when judges may value
efficiency only in part and are provided little incentive to rule efficiently.
Dissatisfied with models that rely on judges to drive the common law to efficiency, other
economists have pursued a different approach based upon the idea that selective litigation causes
the common law to evolve over time toward efficiency. The basic idea of this approach is that
inefficient rules tend to impose greater costs on parties to disputes than do efficient rules. As a
result, parties tend to litigate more when rules are inefficient than when they are efficient. Over

time, this can lead to increasingly efficient rules.13 Others have added the complementary insight
that beneficiaries of efficient rulings have more incentive to invest in litigation than do
beneficiaries of inefficient rulings.14
Subsequent studies have built on these basic insights to explore how the efficiency of the
common law is influenced by precedent, various procedural rules, and asymmetric information.15
Some recent studies have explicitly combined the two approaches, attempting to meld models of
judges holding various preferences with evolutionary models of the common law. Thomas
Miceli, for example, has shown that when judges may be biased, the tendency of the common
law to evolve toward efficiency depends upon the strength of this bias relative to the tendency of
selective litigation to improve common law efficiency.16 Keith Hylton has shown that even
without judge bias, common law efficiency may not occur if either plaintiffs or defendants are
better-informed.17 The consensus of the recent studies is that there is no necessary general
presumption that the common law will approach efficiency.
Regardless of which approach has been taken, virtually all existing studies of common
law efficiency view the evolution of the common law as being governed exclusively by the
actions of the key players in the legal process: judges, and litigants. Befitting the economic
approach, the factors modeled as driving the process have to do with the incentives, information
set, preferences, and attitudes of judges and litigants, and the constraints under which they
operate. Conspicuously lacking in the literature on common law efficiency has been consideration of the effect of other law-making institutions, notably, legislatures. This is not to claim that
economists have ignored the relationship between courts and legislatures. There is indeed a
sizable literature on many aspects of this relationship, including the impact of judicial review on
policy-making, both in the legislatures and in administrative agencies18; the impact of legislative

actions on the content of judicial decision-making19; and forum-shopping by interest groups.20
However, the relationship between statutory law and court rulings has almost entirely failed to
penetrate the literature on the efficiency of the common law.
One key component of the relationship between legislatures and courts is the role of the
courts in sometimes being called upon to rule on the constitutionality of legislative enactments in
the area of public law. Judicial review of legislation is, of course, one of the central functions of
the U.S. system of checks and balances.21 In many cases, especially ones that make it to the
Supreme Court, there is a sizable interpretive grey area, which affords latitude to judges
regarding whether to uphold or overturn a statute.22 When a court decides to uphold a statute –
that is, when it takes a stance of judicial deference – it is taking the position that the statute is
constitutionally legitimate. This means, in essence, that it is upholding the content of the statute
and all of its economic ramifications, including its level of economic efficiency. This ruling then
becomes part of the common law in the relevant area of public law: it becomes the court position
on the issue and becomes precedent for future rulings. So if the legislative outcome is inefficient, or redistributive, this implies that the common law will be also.
On the other hand, when a court overturns a statute, it is again taking a position but now,
it is a position different from that of the legislature. I will call this case judicial activism. Here,
the position of the court is different from that of the legislature, which means that the economic
content of the statute is not reflected in the common law. So if the statute is efficient, this
implies that the court position will not be. If the statute is inefficient, that does not necessarily
mean that the common law will be also. Here, it is possible that the common law will be
efficient. Without further assumptions, it is not possible to tell whether it will be more or less

efficient than the reviewed statutory law. All of these implications for the relationship between
statutory and common law will be developed shortly.
As will be discussed more in Section IV, one thing that is apparent from even a cursory
examination of U.S. legal history is that the courts have varied widely in their propensity to
engage in judicial review. At times, the courts have largely deferred to the legislatures while at
other times, they have intervened assertively and, some would argue, excessively.23 The famous
1905 case of Lochner v. New York is commonly viewed as a particularly egregious example of
an overly interventionist court.24 On the other hand, the 1984 case of Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council is viewed as setting a standard of judicial deference to decisions
made by administrative agencies acting as agents of legislatures.25 It is also the case that the
tendency of the courts to defer to legislatures can vary systematically with the general subject
matter.26 One question, to be addressed in this paper, is how to interpret this history of judicial
review in terms of what it means for the efficiency of the common law.
III.

A model of judicial review and the efficiency of the common law
To understand the argument, consider a simple model of policy outcomes, which can be

achieved either by statutes or court rulings. There is a single dimension of such outcomes, so
that all policies may be represented as a point along a line. Denote a particular statute as AL and
a particular court ruling as AC. Assume that there is an efficient policy, which we will call E.
The total surplus available to society is an amount V, which is a function of the policy
chosen. V is maximized at point E (Figure 1). Assume that V is a monotonically declining
function of the distance between E and any policy A:
dV/d(|E – A|) < 0

(1)

Here, the amount of surplus is a declining function of the absolute value of the distance between
E and any policy A. In any model of judicial-legislative interaction, there is always the question
of expectations: whether the actors recognize their relationship and build that interaction into
their behavior. In my model, courts are assumed to behave non-strategically. This means that
they service their preferences by simply choosing an ideal position; that is, one that maximizes
their utility net of costs, based on whatever arguments are contained in their objective functions.
This assumption allows for the policy preferences of judges to be given expression, in their
choice of ideal position. At the same time, it is consistent with a system where judges are the
final arbiter of constitutionality, which largely obviates the need for them to behave strategically.
Legislators, on the other hand, may well have incentive to behave strategically. Here, I
will focus on two cases, where legislators are either naïve, or sophisticated, in their interactions
with the courts. The main difference between the two cases is whether legislators anticipate, and
potentially respond to, the prospect of judicial review ex ante in terms of the statutes they
consider enacting.
A. Naïve legislators
Let us begin by assuming that legislators do not interact with the courts in any sort of
sophisticated way. This dynamic will be captured by the assumption that legislators simply
select their preferred policy, a decision that is not conditional upon any anticipated court
response. Equivalently, this case corresponds analytically to a situation where either there is no
(or completely ineffective) judicial review, so that the legislature’s perceived probability of
being reviewed or overturned is zero. This assumption will be relaxed later by assuming that the
legislative policy is endogenous to the court’s position.

Assume first a situation where the courts always defer to the legislatures, what we will
call judicial deference, or JD. In our model, this implies immediately that the court’s position is
the same as that of the legislature, or AL = AJDC (see Figure 1). If so, the total level of societal
surplus will be the same. This implies immediately that if the legislative outcome is efficient, so
too will be the court ruling that defers to it (AEffL = AEffC = E). Conversely, any inefficiency in
the legislative outcome will be immediately reflected in the court ruling. (AL = AJDC ≠ E).
Now consider a court stance of judicial review, or JR. This implies immediately that AL
≠ AC. In Figure 1, for example, AJRC ≠ AL. In this case, the efficiency of the legislation will not
equal that of the courts. One immediate conclusion is that if the legislative outcome is efficient,
the court’s position will not be. One would not expect this to happen, however, if one believes,
as many scholars do, that courts tend to be more efficient than legislatures.
The more interesting, and perhaps more empirically relevant, case is where the legislative
outcome is inefficient, so that social surplus is not maximized (AL ≠ E). It follows immediately
that strategy JD, in which the courts always accede to the legislature, is always inefficient.
However, the strategy JR may be either efficient or inefficient, depending upon the relationship
of Ac to both AL and E. The best case scenario for JR is where AC = AEffC = E, in which case JR
is efficient (Figure 1). In all other cases, JR will be inefficient, in which case the interesting
question is whether surplus will be greater under AC or AL: that is, whether JR is more or less
efficient than JD. For the purposes of this discussion, assume that AL < E. Here, there are two
main cases of interest, both of which involve the courts moving towards the efficient outcome E:
(1)AL < E, E > AC > AL: In this case, JR is more efficient than JD. This case is shown in
Figure 1, where AL < AJRC < E. Here, the courts intervene in such a way as to reduce the

distance to the efficient policy E. In this case social surplus will be greater if the courts
intervene.
(2)AL < E, AC > E > AL: In this case, it is unclear whether JD is more or less efficient
than JR. If the distance between AL and AC is sufficiently small, then JD should be more
efficient than JA because the distance to E should shrink. However, it is possible that the level
of judicial review will be intrusive enough that JD will be less efficient. This would happen if
the courts overshoot the mark by enough that surplus V actually goes down. It should be clear
that any sufficiently aggressive judicial policy – that is, greater than B – will be efficiencyreducing. In Figure 1, such a policy is shown as AIneffC. How much you worry about this
possibility depends upon how you feel about the relative efficiency of the common law vs.
statutory law. In particular, if you believe the common law is more efficient, it should be
obvious that the courts will never choose outcomes greater than B. In this case, judicial activism
should be efficiency-enhancing.27
B. Sophisticated legislators
In this case, legislators are aware of the possibility that the courts may review, and
possibly overturn, their preferred legislation. For simplicity, I will assume that their expectation
is that the court’s decision is binding, without the possibility of appeal. I will also assume that
they know with certainty the court’s preferred position, but they operate under some uncertainty
regarding the likelihood that the court will enforce it.28 This uncertainty is captured by the
parameter P, defined as the probability the court will not step in to enforce its preferred position,
in which case the chosen policy of the legislature will stand. P is assumed to be an increasing
function of the distance between AL and AC:
dP/d([|AL – AC|]) > 0

(2)

That is, the greater is the difference between the policy of the legislature and the preferred policy
of the court, the greater is the likelihood that the court will intervene to overturn the legislative
policy.
Under these assumptions, the value function of the legislature may be expressed as:
VL = P(AL – AC) VL(AC*) + [1 – P(AL – AC)] VL(AL*)

(3)

In words, equation (3) says that the legislature’s expected value from legislation is a probabilityweighted function of the value it derives from its ideal legislation and that preferred by the
courts. Assuming the standard conditions for differentiability, we may differentiate with respect
to AL and derive the following first-order condition:
P [VL (AC*) – VL (AL*)] + (1 – P) dVL/dAL* = 0

(4)

Two conclusions follow directly from equation (4). First, under strategy JD (judicial deference),
the legislature will choose its preferred legislation. This follows because in this case, P = 0 and
equation (4) then implies that dVL/dAL* = 0. Assuming that the legislature chooses inefficient
legislation, this implies that the judge’s ruling will also be inefficient. So even with
sophisticated legislators, the common law is predicted to be inefficient if the courts defer to the
legislature.
Second, under strategy JR (judicial review), the legislature will not choose its preferred
position. This follows from (4) because in this case, 0 < P < 1. Assuming that [VL (AC*) – VL
(AL*)] < 0 (that is, that the legislature prefers its preferred position to that of the courts), it is
easy to show that dV/dAL* > 0. Assuming differentiability of the value function V, this implies
that there is some other AL that would yield greater value to the legislature. In the extreme case
where P = 1 (the court always intervenes, an extreme form of judicial review), the legislature
simply chooses the court’s preferred position, which follows from the fact that [VL (AC*) – VL

(AL*)] = 0. In this case, the efficiency of the common law depends upon the ability of the courts
to choose the efficient position, which may or may not occur under either evolutionary theories
of the common law or ones based on judicial preferences.
One important question is whether one would expect judicial review to be more efficient
than judicial deference. The answer to this question does not depend upon the courts’ ability to
choose the efficient outcome, which is informationally quite demanding, even if courts value
efficiency highly in their objective function. Rather, given these informational challenges, the
question is: Are the courts likely to move in the “right” direction? If legislatures are
sophisticated, this discussion suggests that the answer is yes. If courts are more efficient than
legislatures, the specter of judicial review may be sufficient to pull legislatures toward more
efficient positions, even if the court does not know where those efficient positions are. That is,
when legislatures are sophisticated, the courts may have influence over their choice of policy
simply by having an interventionist reputation. And the more strongly it can signal that it will
intervene, the more influence it will have.
What does all of this imply about the efficiency of the common law? First, if you
believe that statutory law is inefficient, a general stance of judicial deference implies that the
common law will also be inefficient. This conclusion follows directly from the fact that its
outcomes then match those of statutory law. Thus, in principle judicial deference can make the
common law inefficient, and the more inefficient is statutory law, the more inefficient common
law will be as well. Thus, in this view the efficiency of the common law does not only depend
upon the relative stakes of litigants, which drives evolutionary theories of the law.29 Nor does it
necessarily depend upon the preferences of judges for various objectives, only one of which may

be efficiency. If, for whatever reason, judges defer to legislatures, their rulings will reflect
whatever inefficiencies exist in the statutes enacted by those legislatures.
Why might judges adopt a position of deferring to legislatures? Importantly, in U.S.
political thought there is a deep-seated tradition, originating in the revolutionary era, that courts
should be reticent about overturning statutes because those statutes were designed by dulyelected representatives of the people. Under this view, judicial deference is about honoring the
will of the people, or what is sometimes referred to as majoritarianism. Tendencies to
majoritarian attitudes vary across judges, but at times, they can appear quite strongly and make
themselves clearly felt in court doctrine.30 Reinforcing a majoritarianist attitude is the belief
among some judges that overturning statutes may constitute substituting their own personal
preferences and values for those of the majority. Though controversial, such attitudes appear to
exert strong influence on the thinking of many judges.31
A corollary to this argument is that the desirability of judicial deference on efficiency
grounds may vary depending upon political conditions and in particular, upon various factors
identified by public choice theory that determine political outcomes. A key factor emphasized in
the literature is the political dominance of interest groups in the legislative process. If political
dominance tends to lead to more inefficient legislative outcomes, this implies that judicial
deference will also be more inefficient under those circumstances. This implies that factors that
affect whether interest groups dominate might matter as well, including the distribution of costs
and benefits from a particular statute; factors such as interest group heterogeneity, which affect
political transaction costs; and structural elements of legislatures, such as committee assignments
and oversight.32

IV.

Judicial deference over U.S. history
It is, of course, well known to legal scholars that the emphasis on judicial deference has

evolved over time as a practice of the courts. In the United States, judicial deference emerged
from the revolutionary era based on the Jeffersonian notion that the primary responsibility for
interpreting the Constitution should be in the hands of the people, and not the courts.33 Practically speaking, this meant that the courts should defer to the legislature, which was composed of
duly-elected representatives of the people, and who therefore were serving their will. The early
years of the Republic witnessed strong disagreements between two main factions – the
Jeffersonian Republicans and the Federalists – with the latter firmly opposed to placing too much
political power in the hands of the people and therefore, leery of excessive legislative power.
However, the collapse of the Federalist Party, especially after the War of 1812, confirmed the
primacy of the Jeffersonian conception of judicial deference.
Since this early period, we have observed, over the past roughly two hundred years, a
cycling back-and-forth between periods of judicial deference and judicial review. During the
early 19th century, the courts appear to have largely deferred to legislatures. However, judicial
review ascended in the wake of Reconstruction through the Progressive Era, arguably fell after
1905 with the famous Lochner ruling, and then rose again in the 1950’s with the increased
prominence of social issues such as abortion and civil rights.34 Finally, the increase in judicial
activism beginning in the 1950’s spurred a sharp conservative response beginning in the Reagan
years, and we currently appear to be in a period of strong tension between the two impulses.35
If indeed judicial deference and judicial review have cycled back and forth over the
years, our argument has certain implications for the efficiency of the common law. First,
consider our result that during periods of judicial deference, the common law in specific areas of

the law is predicted to be efficient only if the relevant statutory law is efficient. The question is
then: During the periods of judicial deference, how efficient is statutory law? The answer seems
to be that this has changed over time. During the 19th century, there is evidence that statutory
law was relatively efficient and certainly more efficient than it is now. In the area of property
law, for example, fee simple land titles were generally mandated by legislative statute.36 Paul
Rubin has argued that its earlier (relative) efficiency may be due to structural factors such as high
organization costs, which militated against repeat litigation involving organized interest groups,
especially ones with long-term interests in the outcome of litigated cases.37 However, in the 20th
century there are many examples of arguably inefficient statutes, such as laws governing zoning,
occupational licensing, rent control, and minimum wages. This shift is consistent with increasing interest group influence over time. And if so, it may be that judicial deference used to
support efficient outcomes much more than it does now.
What can we say about the periods where the courts were more active, in terms of
judicial review? The model suggests that such a stance is more justified on efficiency grounds
when statutes are expected to be inefficient. In this sense, judicial review makes more sense now
than it did during the 19th century, if you believe that statutes have become increasingly inefficient over time. This is consistent with the position of the many scholars who have supported
judicial review to counter current interest group influence. Notice, however, that the reason is
quite different from the standard story. Judicial review is justified not to make statutory law
more efficient but potentially, to make common law less inefficient. But the model suggests that
whether judicial review is actually preferred on efficiency grounds ultimately comes down to
whether courts generally make more efficient decisions than legislatures do. Those less sanguine

about the courts in this way may then view the late-20th century increase in judicial review as
reflecting an efficiency-equity tradeoff.
V.

An extended example: Judicial review of occupational licensing
In this section, I take a closer look at judicial-legislative interactions concerning one

particular species of economic legislation: occupational licensing. This is an apt focus of study
here for several reasons. First, occupational licensing is a widespread phenomenon, practiced in
every state of the Union and covering dozens of occupations responsible for a significant amount
of economic activity.38 Second, ever since George Stigler advanced his famous interest theory of
economic regulation, economists have been very interested in occupational licensing as a prime
example of “regulation on behalf of the regulated.”39 That literature has derived specific testable
implications of the theory, which can be used to evaluate the desirability of judicial review.
Third, occupational licensing has historically involved certain constitutional issues,
which courts have been called upon to weigh in on. Historically, there have been multiple
possible constitutional bases for challenging occupational licensing statutes. One, applied early
on by the courts, was the Contract Clause. As applied to the occupational licensing issue, the
question was whether legislatures had the constitutional power to prevent people from making
their own contracts (say, with their own dentist, or barber).40 Another was the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses, which formed the basis for a challenge to a statute licensing opticians
in the leading case of Williamson v. Lee Optical.41 Recently, the question has arisen of whether
occupational licensing statutes may be challenged on antitrust grounds.42 So far, the answer
appears to be no.43 We thus have a rich history of judicial review, including the famous Lochner
case itself, to provide evidence regarding the issue of common law efficiency.

Finally, occupational licensing has an extremely long history in the United States, dating
back to colonial times, when lawyers and inn-keepers were licensed.44 This long history enables
us to observe changes in the application of judicial review over time. In section VI, I will return
to the question of how judicial review of occupational licensing has changed over time, and the
interpretive implications for economic efficiency.
The dominant economic theory of occupational licensing is that it facilitates the exercise
of market power by practitioners in the regulated profession by restricting entry, impeding occupational mobility, and imposing restrictions on business practices. Under this view, it derives
from and supports the interests of members of a profession in reducing competition for their
services, and generally leads to reduced entry and increased earnings for those able to obtain a
license. In other words, occupational licensing effectively serves to cartelize an occupation,
affording practitioners the opportunity to obtain monopoly rents.
This cartel explanation is very different from a view that I will call the good government
view, which argues that occupational licensing addresses a market failure that arises from a
problem of asymmetric information in markets for many specialized services. It is often the case
that sellers of these services are better informed than buyers are about the quality of those
services. This can lead to a process of adverse selection in which lower quality services drive
higher quality services from the market.45 In this case, occupational licensing may serve the
positive function of maintaining levels of quality in provision of the services, thus benefiting
consumers.
Obviously, the cartel story and the good government story have very different efficiency
implications. Under the cartel view, occupational licensing reduces societal welfare by reducing
supply, reducing service quality, and raising costs to consumers. Under the good government

view, occupational licensing increases societal welfare by correcting a market failure. This
implies, according to our model, that in order for the common law to be efficient, courts should
defer to the legislature if the good government model correctly characterizes occupational
licensing. If, however, the cartel model is the better characterization, then deference to the
legislature implies the common law is inefficient.
A great deal of evidence from a large number of economic studies strongly supports the
view that the cartel model provides the better characterization of occupational licensing. The
evidence suggests that entry is commonly blockaded into professions requiring occupational
licensing, resulting in fewer suppliers, decreased occupational mobility, higher prices, and
possibly adverse effects on quality. And the negative effects of occupational licensing can be
quite large. For example, a recent study by Kleiner and Krueger found licensing to be associated
with an average 18% increase in wages across a range of occupations. This wage effect was
roughly comparable to the effect of unionization.46
Considered from a public choice perspective, these numbers imply that the effective
demand for occupational licensing among practitioners in the licensed occupation should be
quite high. These sorts of arrangements confer large benefits on a concentrated, homogeneous
constituency – practitioners in the licensed profession – who then have every reason to actively
engage in rent-seeking. At the same time, the costs of occupational licensing are dispersed and
small on a per capita basis to those bearing the costs – mostly consumers and blockaded
practitioners. These groups are thus not only given relatively little incentive to provide political
resistance, they are likely to experience much greater transaction costs in organizing to resist.
At the same time, the courts have largely been invisible in ruling on legislativelymandated occupational licensing arrangements. One commentator observes that judicial

challenges to occupational licensing arrangements in the United States virtually disappeared by
the late 1930s.47 Edlin and Haw have recently described court rulings that overturn occupational
licensing statutes as being “rare.”48 Paul Spinden has also recently argued that courts have conferred “virtually unfettered discretion” on states when it comes to enacting licensing statutes.49
The combination of high demand and absence of legal challenges has contributed to an
explosion of occupational licensing activity in the United States. As of the year 2000, roughly
18% of all U.S. workers were directly affected by occupational licensing.50 There is no reason to
believe that this number has gone down since then. Indeed, when Kleiner and Krueger conducted a survey for their study in 2008, almost 29% of their respondents were licensed. Currently,
the percentage might be closer to 33%.51 All of this implies not only that the common law, by
largely deferring to state and local legislatures, is inefficient in how it treats occupational
licensing, but that the economic consequences are likely quite large.
VI.

Judicial review of occupational licensing over time
Some additional insights are gained by comparing the present situation to periods in the

past, and here we can take advantage of the long history of occupational licensing in the United
States. Occupational licensing in the U.S. has been around since colonial times, but until late in
the 19th century, the practice was largely confined to the medical and legal professions.52
However, beginning in around 1890 – roughly the start of the Progressive Era – it began to be
applied to a wide range of occupations in a number of different states. By the mid-20th century,
the number of state occupational licensing statutes totaled over 1,200, governing more than
seventy-five different occupations.53
Here, I will focus on the Progressive Era, which was a key formative period in the
development of occupational licensing in the United States.54 There are two key questions here.

First, how did the courts treat the explosion of occupational licensing statutes? And how do we
interpret this response in terms of economic efficiency?
Let us begin with the question of economic efficiency. As we have seen, there are two
components to answering this question: the efficiency of legislation, and the court response.
Recent research by Marc Law and Sukkoo Kim suggests that occupational licensing during the
Progressive Era may need to be interpreted differently than the consensus view of the economics
profession regarding present-day occupational licensing. They note that the Progressive Era was
a period not merely of dramatic increases in occupational licensing statutes. This period also
witnessed the emergence of a number of new professional occupations, including teaching,
engineering, dentistry, accounting, and many more. During this dynamic time period with many
new and emerging occupations, problems of asymmetric information regarding the quality of
practitioners were particularly acute. They present evidence that suggests that occupational
licensing may have had important welfare-enhancing properties by helping to solve the
asymmetric information problem.55 If so, on the whole it may have been more efficient during
the Progressive Era than it appears to be now.
The question then becomes: What role did the courts play in reviewing these statutes? In
particular, if there is validity to Law and Kim’s finding that occupational licensing had welfareenhancing qualities during the Progressive Era, a general court stance of judicial deference
would have promoted efficiency, unlike a similar stance now. However, some research by
Lawrence Friedman suggests that the courts were quite active in reviewing, and overturning,
occupational licensing statutes during the Progressive Era.56 Friedman examined judicial review
of occupational licensing statutes in a number of different states and for a wide range of
occupations. These occupations included: architects, bakers, barbers, dentists, embalmers,

horseshoers, peddlers, plumbers, pharmacists, physicians, undertakers, veterinarians, and more.
Friedman’s main finding is that during this period, the courts were on the whole distinctly
interventionist in overturning occupational licensing statutes. Says Friedman:
“[J]udicial self-restraint … is so conspicuously lacking in the great constitutional
cases and in a fair share of the occupational licensing cases. When all is said and
done, the phenomenon which demands explanation is the activism of the courts of
1890 to 1910.”57
In terms of our model, of course, all of this evidence does not speak well of the common
law, in terms of economic efficiency. To the extent that occupational licensing promoted efficiency by addressing information asymmetries per Law and Kim, courts interested in promoting
efficiency should have deferred to these statutes. Overall, for those interested in promoting
efficiency, the courts seem to be getting things all wrong: overturning statutes when they seem to
be promoting efficiency (back then), and deferring to statutes when they seem to be inefficient
(now). What is going on here?
VII.

An econometric analysis of Progressive Era judicial review of occupational licensing
In order to provide further insight into the efficiency of judicial review, I have undertaken

an econometric analysis of legal challenges to occupational licensing statutes brought in state
supreme courts during the Progressive Era. This analysis is based on 496 cases brought in state
(N = 480), federal(N = 14), and territorial(N = 2) courts between 1885 and 1911 in which state or
municipal occupational licensing statutes were challenged on various grounds.58 This period
essentially corresponds to the timeframe of Friedman’s study, but is extended backwards by five
years to include a large number of additional cases. The final dataset includes virtually all cases
found in a search of occupational licensing cases in Nexis-Uni. The cases cover eighteen
different occupations in forty-four states, two territories, and the District of Columbia.59

The key empirical question is whether or not the propensity of the courts to sustain a
challenge to an occupational licensing statute is systematically correlated with the efficiency of
that statute. If the Progressive Era courts tended to uphold efficient statutes and to overturn
inefficient statutes, then this provides suggestive evidence that the common law regarding
occupational licensing during this period tended to efficiency.
The cases in our database are separated into two categories corresponding to whether or
not a statute was challenged either on constitutional grounds or on some other basis. A challenge
was considered constitutional if it was based on an article contained in either the federal constitution or the jurisdiction’s state constitution. The most common federal constitutional grounds for
challenging a statute was that it violated either the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of
the 14th amendment. Also providing grounds for challenge in a significant number of cases was
the Commerce Clause, particularly for itinerant occupations like peddlers, liquor salesmen, and
railroad ticket sellers. In only one case was a challenge brought on 1st amendment Contract
Clause grounds. All of this is consistent with legal histories that tend to emphasize due process
challenges to issues involving state regulation of property rights during this era.60
Typical grounds for challenging on state constitutional grounds tended to mirror grounds
for federal constitutional challenges. This is because most state constitutions contained relevant
clauses that were similar to clauses in the federal constitution, such as due process or equal
protection. Other state constitutional grounds for challenge were that it constituted special
legislation, embraced more than one subject, or involved improper delegation of authority to a
licensing board.61 Finally, statutes could be, and were, challenged on a wide variety of technical
non-constitutional grounds. These included: improper awarding of costs, challenging a statute’s
definition of what constituted suitable training, transferability of a license from one county to the

next, alleged animosity of licensing board, alleged favoritism of licensing board, appropriate
jurisdiction for licensing fee, appropriate mode of payment, appropriate definition of an occupation, corporate status of practitioner, and whether existing practitioners are grandfathered in.62
In the analysis, I distinguish between constitutional and non-constitutional cases because
in theory, we might expect the effect of court rulings to differ in the data. Importantly, a ruling
on constitutional grounds is generally a ruling on either upholding the statute or overturning it.
So, for example, if a court rules on constitutional grounds against a defendant charged with
practicing dentistry without a license in defiance of a licensing statute, this is interpreted as
deferring to the legislative body that enacted the statute. This implies that it is aligning its
position with the statute and the efficiency of that statute. Thus, if the court is behaving
efficiently, there should be a negative correlation between the efficiency of the statute and the
probability of a court reversal.
A ruling on non-constitutional grounds, however, cannot be so easily interpreted. The
non-constitutional grounds for a challenge were many and varied, and they often did not bear a
clear relationship to the efficiency of the statute. For example, in one of the above cases, the
legal question was whether a license was portable from one county to the next. In another case,
the question was whether massage therapists should be treated as physicians. In both of these
examples, it was a question of how the statute should be interpreted, not whether the statute itself
was valid. Therefore, we have no clear expectation regarding the correlation for cases involving
challenges brought on non-constitutional grounds. We will take a closer look at these nonconstitutional challenges below for further evidence on the efficiency of the court treatment of
occupational licensing.

In order to implement my strategy, I require a way to distinguish efficient licensing statutes from inefficient ones. Toward this end, I divide up the occupations into two sub-categories,
which I call professional and non-professional. Table 1 lists all occupations, the category they
have been assigned to, and the number of cases in the sample involving each occupation. These
categories reflect the distinction between traditional and emerging occupations, as well as
increased specialization, during this dynamic time period. The categories are also intended to
reflect the question of asymmetric information regarding practitioner quality, which was likely a
bigger issue with the occupations listed as “professional.”63 Table 1 indicates that the occupations most commonly subjected to challenge were physicians and peddlers, but all included
occupations, except for bakers and optometrists, had at least six cases. Both professional(N =
245) and non-professional(N = 251) occupations are heavily represented.
There is suggestive evidence in the opinions that judges tended to invoke asymmetric
information and occupational quality control more commonly when licensing statutes involved
professional occupations. For example, in three of the eight cases involving veterinarians, the
opinions explicitly invoked practitioner quality as a basis for upholding statutes, using language
such as: “exclud(ing) the incompetent person from the practice,” “raising the standard of
proficiency (for practicing veterinarians),” and “protection from fakirs(sic) and quacks.”64
Similarly, the opinions in rulings involving pharmacists and dentists contain phrases like:
“protection of the public from incompetent druggists,” “protect the public against the mistakes
and ignorance of incompetent and unskilled persons,” and “protection of the public from
impostors and incompetents.”65 In some cases, the two possible economic interpretations were
even explicitly recognized by the courts. This occurred, for example, in the 1897 case of State v.
Call, which involved a challenge to a North Carolina law licensing physicians. In State, the

court characterized the statute as “an exercise of the police power for the protection of the public
against incompetents and impostors, and it is in no sense the creation of a monopoly or special
privileges.”66
The above quotes, all of which pertain to what we are calling professional occupations,
stand in stark contrast to the opinion in a 1908 case challenging a Mississippi statute licensing
plumbers, which I classify as a non-professional occupation:
“It is stealing its way into the statutes for the ostensible purpose of raising revenue
for the state, when in truth and in fact the only purpose of the promoters of such
legislation is to control the business to which it is directed, to shut out competition,
create a monopoly, and force those unable to pay the tax and possessing a
knowledge of the business to look to the ones in control of the monopoly for
employment.”67
A more systematic look at the data reveals some suggestive patterns relating to the propensity for occupational licensing statutes to be overturned on constitutional grounds. Whereas
55 statutes involving non-professional occupations that were challenged on constitutional
grounds were overturned, only eight involving professional occupations were similarly
overturned. These numbers constitute 42% and 9% of the total challenges in each category
respectively, indicating that in the raw data, the Progressive Era courts were significantly more
reticent about overturning statutes involving professional occupations. Figure 2 reports the
percentage of statutes overturned on constitutional grounds, by occupation. Again, the overall
indication is that the courts were significantly less likely to overturn statutes involving
professional occupations. All of this is consistent with courts tending to promote efficiency: to
tend to uphold statutes that were more likely to address problems of asymmetric information
rather than impose an occupational monopoly.
For further evidence regarding the court treatment of these licensing statutes, we now
turn to an econometric analysis of the court rulings. In this analysis, the dependent variable is

the variable Overturned, which is a categorical variable that assumes a value of 1 when a
practitioner successfully challenges a statute, and 0 otherwise.68 The variable Professional is a
categorical variable that assumes a value of 1 if the occupation is professional and 0 if the
occupation is non-professional. In the analysis this variable is modeled as the treatment effect in
determining the outcome Overturned. Our sampling strategy – selecting all cases in Nexis-uni
with the key words “[occupation]” and “license” during the time period – is designed to avoid
selection error. The resulting sample is not representative of all legal challenges to licensing
statutes, as some cases would have been settled and not all litigated cases would have made it to
the state Supreme Court. However, it is fairly representative of all state Supreme Court rulings,
which because of their precedential value would have been central to the issue of the efficiency
of the common law.
One complicating factor concerns the legislative use of the police power, particularly
with regard to public health issues. In general, during this period the courts were highly
sympathetic to legislatures exercising the police power in order to promote the public good. A
number of cases in our sample involved issues of public health, which the courts considered an
important component of broad-based benefits to the public. Furthermore, evidence from the
opinions suggests that even in cases decided on constitutional grounds, the presence of a
compelling public health concern may have made the courts less likely to rule that a case was
unconstitutional. For example, in the 1905 case of State v. Brown, an occupational licensing
statute for dentists was challenged on constitutional grounds. In this case, the Washington state
Supreme Court spoke clearly to a tradeoff between public health considerations and
constitutionality:

“Ordinarily, a natural and constitutional personal right or privilege may be limited
only when its free exercise threatens or endangers the moral or physical well-being
of others or their property...”69
In order to control for the possible effect of public health considerations on court rulings, I define
a categorical variable PublicHealth that assumes a value of 1 when concern for public health was
cited as a relevant factor in a ruling to uphold a statute, and 0 otherwise.
Another factor relates to discrimination. A significant subset of the cases involved
challenges to licensing statutes on the basis that they discriminated, on the basis of geography,
demographic factors, or disability. Challenges where discrimination was involved may have
been treated differently by the courts, for two reasons. First, these cases were more likely to run
afoul of the equal protection clauses of either the federal or state constitution. Second, the courts
may have treated these cases differently if judges viewed them as involving issues of fairness or
justice.70 In order to control for the effect of these considerations on court rulings, I define a
categorical variable Discrimination that assumes a value of 1 when a statute subject to a constitutional challenge allegedly involved discrimination against some group, and 0 otherwise.
The models to be estimated are of the form:
Overturnedi = f(Professionali, Constitutionali, PublicHealthi, Discriminationi,
Timet) + ui

(5)

where Overturned is the outcome and Professional is the treatment effect. The variable
Constitutional is a categorical variable that assumes a value of 1 when the statute was challenged
on constitutional grounds and 0 otherwise. This model controls for legal challenges involving
issues of public health or discrimination.71 A time trend Time, defined as the year in which a
court case is decided, is included to investigate possible secular changes in judicial activism
within the period, and non-linear trends are considered.

Table 2 reports the results of a series of conditional logit estimations that investigate the
impact of our treatment variable Professional on the probability of a statute being overturned.
The results of six estimations are reported, one for the entire sample and the remaining five
omitting, in turn, the five occupations that are most common in the sample. As it turns out, the
coefficient on Time is always insignificant and therefore, the table reports the results with the
variable excluded from the models. The remaining coefficients are highly robust to its exclusion.
Of most interest is the negative and highly significant coefficient on Professional, which
signifies that controlling for other factors, the courts were significantly less likely to overturn
statutes governing professional occupations. Columns (2) through (6) indicate that this result is
highly robust to the selective exclusion of occupations, suggesting that the results are not driven
by the court treatment of particular occupations.72 Interpreting the results of column (1) for the
full sample, these estimated coefficients generate a predicted probability of 11% that licensing
statutes governing professional occupations would be overturned on constitutional grounds,
assuming no public health or discrimination issues were involved. For non-professional
occupations, the corresponding probability is over 23%.
It is also noteworthy that licensing statutes were significantly less likely to be overturned
on constitutional grounds than on non-constitutional grounds, again controlling for other factors.
This is the interpretation of the negative and highly significant coefficient on Constitutional.
Furthermore, the positive and highly significant coefficient on Discrimination indicates that
statutes were significantly more likely to be overturned when discrimination against some group
was an issue in some way. Again interpreting column (1), the model generates a predicted
probability of 36% that statutes governing professional occupations will be overturned on nonconstitutional grounds, again assuming that no public health or discrimination issues were

involved. For non-professional occupations, this predicted probability rises to 58%. However,
when discrimination was an issue, these predicted probabilities rise to 62% and 80% respectively.
Because these probability estimates may be sensitive to implicit restrictions imposed on
the model, I undertake additional analysis that explores the effect of relaxing these restrictions.
One key restriction concerns capturing the effect of occupation grouping with Professional as a
stand-alone categorical variable. Another restriction is that unobserved factors that vary across
individual occupations are not captured in the specification. This latter assumption is of particular concern because to the extent that occupation-level unobserved factors are correlated with the
included regressors, the coefficient estimates may be subject to bias. In order to address these
issues, I divide the sample into two sub-samples, corresponding to professional and nonprofessional occupations. In addition to estimating these models separately, I include occupation-level categorical variables (fixed effects). The resulting model specification becomes:
Overturnedi = ß0 + ß1 Constitutionali + ß2 PublicHealthi + ß3 Discriminationi
+ ∑ ßi DOcci + ui

(6)

where DOcci assumes a value of 1 for the ith occupation and 0 otherwise.
Table 3 reports the results of a second set of estimations based on equation (6), using
both linear probability models(LPM) and conditional logit estimations. This specification yields
a pattern of results that is extremely similar to those of the previous models. The key findings
are the consistently negative and highly significant coefficients on Constitutional in the
regressions for both professional and non-professional occupations. This signifies that regardless
of the occupation grouping, licensing statutes are significantly less likely to be overturned on
constitutional grounds, all else equal. The estimated coefficients imply a predicted probability of

about 3.5% that a licensing statute involving the base (omitted) professional occupation –
physicians – would be overturned if challenged on constitutional grounds. For the base nonprofessional occupation – peddlers – this probability is 32.4%. Thus, again we see a dramatically smaller likelihood that licensing statutes for professional occupations would be overturned
than similar statutes for non-professional occupations.
The other significant finding shown in Table 3 is that cases involving discrimination are
significantly more likely to be than overturned than ones that do not. And similarly to before,
the effect is quite large. For the base professional occupation – physicians – the predicted
probability is 13.7% of a statute being overturned on constitutional grounds when discrimination
in some form is also involved. The same predicted probability for the base non-professional
occupation – peddlers – is 53.7%. As before, these results are robust to the exclusion of various
individual occupations, the omission of different individual states, and the treatment of time
trends.
The takeaway message of these results is two-fold. First, licensing statutes were more
likely to be upheld on constitutional grounds than on non-constitutional grounds. Second,
holding other factors constant, licensing statutes governing professional occupations were much
more likely to be upheld than comparable ones governing non-professional occupations. As I
have argued, the constitutionality issue is key to the question of the efficiency of the common
law. The evidence presented here suggests that the Progressive Era courts were significantly
more supportive of legislative attempts to license professional occupations than non-professional
occupations. This is consistent with an efficiency-supporting view of the courts, since asymmetric information regarding practitioner quality was more likely to be an issue for consumers of
professional occupations.

Perhaps emblematic of this discussion is the case of Lochner v. New York. In this
famous, and exceedingly controversial, ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned an occupational licensing statute for bakers. This ruling is considered by many to be a classic example of
unwarranted judicial activism, one that offered an important lesson: the need for judges to err on
the side of deferring to legislative actions.73 So on a general level, it exemplifies Friedman’s
general conclusion that judicial restraint was “so conspicuously lacking” during this era.
However, baking, the occupation in question, is one where one might think that asymmetric
information regarding practitioner quality is largely a non-issue. If the associated benefits of
occupational licensing are therefore relatively small, then there may be an efficiency sense in
which courts would be warranted in overturning the statute.
The complicating factor in terms of interpreting Lochner is the fact that the occupation of
baking was, at the time, a horrendous, unhealthful pursuit. The health issue for bakers
dominated the majority opinion as well as the dissents and has been stressed by many later legal
commentators as a key reason to criticize Lochner. However, in the absence of market failure, it
is difficult to know on what grounds to criticize the ruling, if one’s criterion is economic efficiency. One might argue that there was little asymmetric information, in terms of how terrible it
was to work in one of these bakeries. And if employees knew what they were getting into, and if
other employment opportunities were available, then it is unclear why wages would not have
adjusted to compensate for the notoriously bad working conditions. To be clear, I am not
arguing that we know that wages adjusted. But to my knowledge, no scholar who has criticized
Lochner has ever presented evidence that they did not. And if they did, it is unclear why
upholding the occupational licensing statute would have promoted economic efficiency.

This may be the lesson of the Progressive Era experience regarding the interventionist
tendencies of judges: not entirely one of unbridled judicial activism but rather, selective intervention when it made economic (efficiency) sense. Under this interpretation, the Progressive Era
judges are not looking quite so bad any more. It was not that they were blanket overturning Law
and Kim’s efficiency-promoting occupational licensing statutes. Rather, they were, at least to
some extent, taking circumstances into account and making decisions that mitigated some of the
more egregious abuses of occupational licensing statutes.
VIII.

Conclusions
This paper has argued that the efficiency of the common law cannot be viewed in insti-

tutional isolation. Previous studies of the common law, in either focusing on judge preferences
or the evolutionary unfolding of the common law, have not considered interactions with other
institutional players like legislatures. Yet the institutional structure of the United States
government is not set up this way, nor is it clear that the courts view themselves as being isolated
players. Rather, they see much of their job as being either to pass on the constitutionality of
statutes or to interpret them when constitutionality is not an issue. And the efficiency of the
statutes which they are called to rule upon has direct implications for the efficiency of the
decisions they make. Overturning efficient statutes, or deferring to inefficient ones, both mean
that inefficiencies are then built into the common law. These inefficiencies are then propagated
to the extent that they are built into the expectations of future legislatures regarding what will
pass constitutional muster, and/or future courts respect them as precedent in the cases before
them.
This means that in order to assess the efficiency of the common law, we first need to
assess the efficiency of statutes, and then observe the court response when such statutes are

challenged. On this score, there is no general conclusion we can draw, because of the
tremendous diversity of statutes on all sorts of issues and of the court response to these statutes.
However, by limiting the scope of the question by focusing on a particular genre of statutes, it
may be possible to say more. Here, I have adopted this strategy by examining a particular type
of statute for which there is strong consensus among economists regarding their economic
efficiency or rather, lack thereof: occupational licensing statutes. The current penchant of courts
to largely defer to these statutes implies that the courts have adopted a posture regarding occupational licensing that cannot be viewed as efficient.
It was not always so. During the Progressive Era, courts took a more activist stance
toward occupational licensing statutes, as they apparently did toward a great many other
economic issues. Whether or not this was efficient depends, of course, on the efficiency of those
statutes. Law and Kim found that those statutes may have actually had important efficiencyenhancing properties. And this finding is consistent with other studies that have argued that
statutory law tended to be more efficient in the 19th century than it is at present.74 Selective
judicial activism may be efficiency-enhancing to the extent that it appropriately targets statutes
and overturns the ones that do not serve efficiency objectives. This includes ones that tend to
cartelize an occupation without providing any signaling benefits to overcome informational
asymmetries. We have seen some evidence that state courts during the Progressive Era may
have engaged in appropriate targeting of occupational licensing statutes. If so, this suggests that
the common law may have become less efficient over time, at least regarding this one important
economic issue.
In order to more comprehensively assess the efficiency of the common law, more studies
are required of how courts have employed judicial review, both historically and in various areas

of the law. Such studies will need to take into account both the likely economic efficiency of the
statutes governing particular areas of economic activity, and the judicial response. Occupational
licensing provides a relatively clean test of our theory, because the efficiency implications are
clear and the judicial response has been relatively clear-cut. Furthermore, clear legal and
constitutional issues were involved.
Other candidates for study might include local rent control ordinances which, like
occupational licensing, have been around for a long time, have relatively clear-cut efficiency
implications, and have been subject to legal challenge.75 In 1986, for example, landlords in
Berkeley, California challenged a recently-enacted rent control ordinance, in a case that involved
both antitrust and Contract Clause issues. In Fisher v. City of Berkeley, the Supreme Court
upheld the rent control ordinance.76 In the 1999 case of Santa Monica Beach v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles, the California Supreme Court ruled that the rent control ordinance of the city of
Santa Monica did not violate the Takings Clause.77 It should easily be possible to investigate the
efficiency of court rulings regarding rent control using the framework provided here, not to
mention other types of statutes. More interesting questions can potentially then be answered.
Not only: Is the common law efficient, but under what political and economic conditions can we
expect it to be more or less efficient, which is the thrust of the more recent literature on the
efficiency of the common law.

Figure 1: Model of judicial review, naïve legislators
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Figure 2: Percentage of cases overturned on constitutional grounds, by occupation
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Table 1: Categorization of occupations
______________________________________________________________________________
Professional

Non-professional

___________________________

__________________________

Occupation

Occupation

Number of cases

Number of cases

______________________________________________________________________________
Architects
6
Bakers
2
Dentists
47
Barbers
14
Engineers
12
Butchers
18
Lawyers
22
Horseshoers
6
Optometrists
3
Liquor salesmen
71
Pharmacists
25
Peddlers
91
Physicians
98
Plumbers
33
Teachers
24
RR ticket salesmen
10
Veterinarians
8
Undertakers
6
______________________________________________________________________________
TOTAL

245

251

Table 2: Propensity to overturn, Professional vs. Non-professional
______________________________________________________________________________
Omitting
____________________________________________________
Full
Liquor
Variable
Sample
Physicians
Dentists
Peddlers
Salesmen
Plumbers
______________________________________________________________________________
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Professional

-0.898****
(0.202)

-0.651***
(0.231)

-0.823**** -0.804**** -1.188**** -0.853****
(0.212)
(0.229)
(0.227)
(0.211)

Constitutional

-1.531**** -1.462**** -1.401**** -1.633**** -1.511**** -1.636****
(0.253)
(0.272)
(0.258)
(0.287)
(0.271)
(0.271)

Discrimination

1.063****
(0.280)

1.186**** 1.038**** 1.140**** 0.771***
(0.307)
(0.285)
(0.345)
(0.296)

1.074****
(0.295)

Public Health

0.450
(0.284)

0.697**
(0.309)

0.418
(0.322)

0.397
(0.289)

0.438
(0.317)

0.419
(0.302)

CONSTANT

0.340**
0.225
0.292*
0.263
0.670***
0.325*
(0.169)
(0.175)
(0.171)
(0.203)
(0.210)
(0.180)
______________________________________________________________________________
N
496
398
449
405
425
463
______________________________________________________________________________
Estimation procedure: Conditional logit.
Figures in parentheses are estimated standard errors.
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; ****Significant at 0.1%.

Table 3: Regression results, Professional, Non-professional sub-samples
______________________________________________________________________________
Professional
_________________________

Non-professional
___________________________

Logit
Logit
________________
__________________
Variable
LPM
No Occ
Occ
LPM
No Occ
Occ
______________________________________________________________________________
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Constitutional

-0.400**** -2.716**** -2.667****
(0.051)
(0.554)
(0.554)

-0.219*** -0.913*** -1.081****
(0.069)
(0.314)
(0.337)

Discrimination

0.183**
(0.075)

1.434**
(0.575)

1.459**
(0.609)

0.212***
(0.079)

0.883**
(0.348)

0.879**
(0.391)

Public Health

0.030*
(0.068)

0.265
(0.600)

0.215
(0.623)

0.153**
(0.309)

0.640*
(0.331)

0.761*
(0.400)

CONSTANT

0.425*** -0.336**
-0.636**
0.511**** 0.047
0.345
(0.040)
(0.167)
(0.268)
(0.046)
(0.187)
(0.279)
______________________________________________________________________________
R2
0.153
0.149
0.164
0.053
0.038
0.083
N
245
245
242
251
251
251
______________________________________________________________________________
LPM: Linear probability model.
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. R2 in columns (2). (3), (5), and (6) are
pseudo R2.
Occupation-level coefficients not reported. Omitted occupations: physicians and
peddlers. N = 242 in column (3) because the three cases involving optometrists were dropped
from the estimation, as all were overturned on constitutional grounds.
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; ****Significant at 0.1%.
______________________________________________________________________________
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